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Abstract
This paper examines the strategic nature of choice of environmental standards under 
different degrees of openness of countries. It also compares and contrasts equilibrium 
environmental standards and levels of pollution, local and global, with the world 
optimum levels. It shows that, in case of open economies, environmental standards can be 
strategic substitutes or complements. In equilibrium, countries set higher environmental 
standards in case of open economies compared to that in case of closed economies. It 
also shows that equilibrium standards in case of open economies are higher than the 
world optimum in certain situations. In contrast, countries set lower environmental 
standards, in equilibrium, than the world optimum in absence of international trade.
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1 Introduction
In the wake of trade liberalisation in the world economy and growing en-
vironmental consciousness, the issues of impacts of international trade and
factor mobility on local and global environment are assuming increasing im-
portance. Besides the eﬀects of trade on environmental quality, there exists
concerns that emanate from the use of a lax environment policy and/or stan-
dards as a means to attract investments in speciﬁc jurisdictions. These plant
location decisions, in response to a weaker pollution standard, would have
implications for the pattern of trade and resultant environmental outcomes.
Moreover, countries may free ride on global pollution reduction, at least to
some extent, by setting environmental standards strategically.
In the literature on these issues, environmental standard set by a country
is treated as a part of an endogenous environmental policy having impacts
on both the level and geographical distribution of pollution (e.g., Copeland
and Taylor, 1994, 1995, 2003 and Chichilnisky, 1994). However, it is to be
noted that the standard set in one country may inﬂuence standard setting
actions in other countries. Existing literature ignores this strategic nature of
choice of environmental standard. This paper aims at bridging this gap by
formulating equilibrium standards in a strategic context.
Developing a simple model of two country world, this paper analyses
strategic choice of environmental standards under diﬀerent degrees of open-
ness of countries. It also compares and contrasts equilibrium environmental
3standards and levels of pollution, local and global, under strategic standard
setting with that under cooperative standard setting, i.e., with the world
optimum levels of standards and pollution.
There are two opposing strategic eﬀects in case of open economies, (a) due
to local pollution and (b) due to global pollution, of environmental standards.
The ﬁrst eﬀect induces countries to set higher environmental standards in or-
der to counteract the negative externality generated by the other country’s
environmental standard, whereas the second eﬀect comes from the incentive
to free ride on other country’s eﬀorts to combat global pollution. Therefore,
if the strategic eﬀect due to global pollution dominates (is dominated by) the
strategic eﬀect due to local pollution, environmental standards are strategic
substitutes (complements). In contrary, in case of closed economies, environ-
mental standards are always strategic substitutes, since only the incentive
to free ride is in place. The strategic nature of environmental standards has
implications to the equilibrium environmental standards and pollution levels.
This paper shows that, in case of open economies countries set higher
environmental standards, which may result in lower levels of pollution, com-
pared to that in case of closed economies. The underlying reason behind
this result is, unlike in case of open economies, there is no negative external-
ity of environmental standard of one country to the other in case of closed
economies.
Comparing equilibrium standards under strategic setting with the world
optimum, this paper shows that the world optimum level of environmen-
tal standards may lead to more damage to the environment in case of open
economies in certain situations. It indicates that existence of supranational
authorities that sets environmental standards for countries, or facilitates co-
operative standard setting, may be harmful for the environment in case of
4open economies. In contrast to this, in case of closed economies, cooperative
standard setting always leads to higher environmental standards and levels
of pollution than that under strategic choice of environmental standards.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes
the basic model considering partially open economies. Section 3 analyses the
choice of environmental standards in case of closed economies. Fully open
economies are considered in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model: Partially Open Economies
Suppose that there are two countries, A and B, in the world. Both coun-
tries are partially open in the sense that free trade of commodities between
countries is allowed, but relocations of production units from one country
to another is prohibited by regulation. Both countries aim to minimize loss
due to environmental pollution, which is generated due to production activi-
ties, by imposing environmental standards. We consider pollutants like CO2
which cause both local as well as global pollution. Now, in the free trade
environment, higher environmental standard in one country likely to weaken
its position in international trade, which will induce higher production ac-
tivity in the other country. As a result, higher environmental standard in
country j likely to increase local pollution in country i; i,j = A,B, i  = j.I n
other words, increase in the level of environmental standard in one country
reduces local pollution in that country, but increases local pollution in the
other country. Therefore, we can write the level of local pollution in country
i as follows.
Li = L
0(1 − si + βsj)( 1 )
5In (1), L0 is the level of local pollution in country i in absence of any environ-
mental standard. si (0 ≤ si ≤ 1) denotes environmental standards imposed
in country i. si =0a n dsi = 1 corresponds to two extreme situations, (a)
where there is no environmental standard and (b) the maximum level of en-
vironmental standard is in place, respectively. β (0 <β<1) is the marginal
eﬀect of country j’s standard on country i’s local pollution.
Now, production activities not only generate local environmental pol-
lution, that also contribute to global environmental pollution. The global
environmental pollution can be expressed as
G = G
0(2 − sA − sB), (2)
where G0 is the level of global pollution in absence of environmental stan-
dards.
The cost of imposing environmental standard of country i (i,j = A,B
and i  = j)i sg i v e nb y
Ci = csi + wsi − ρsj, (3)
where c is the marginal implementation (administrative) cost, w is the marginal
economic loss due to higher standard in own country, and ρ is the marginal
economic gain due to higher standard in the other country (0 <c ,0<ρ<
w).
The loss function of country i due to environmental pollution, inclusive





= l(1 − si + βsj)
2 + δg(2 − si − sj)
2 + csi + wsi − ρsj, (4)
where δ (≥ 0) is the weight given to global pollution, l = L02, g = G02;
i,j = A,B,a n di  = j. For the sake of simplicity, we consider that countries
6have symmetric loss functions. That is, we consider that β, c, w, ρ,a n dδ
are invariant across countries. We assume that 2lβ < w + c<2l +4 δg and
2lβ(1 − β) <w+ c − ρ<2l(1 − β)+8 δg, which ensures the equilibrium
environmental standards lie in the unit interval.1
We begin with the scenario where country A and B decide levels of en-
vironmental standards, sA and sB, independently and simultaneously. Both
countries, A and B, want to minimize their respective loss functions by choos-
ing environmental standards appropriately. So, the problem of country i can
be written as,
Minsi Di = l(1 − si + βsj)
2 + δg(2 − si − sj)
2 + csi + wsi − ρsj. (5)




∂sj∂si = −2βl < 0), and strategic eﬀect due to global pollution
(
∂2(δG2)





∂si )=2 ( δg − βl).
If β<
δg
l , i.e., if the strategic eﬀect due to global pollution dominates the
strategic eﬀect due to local pollution, marginal reduction in loss due an
increase in si decreases with an increase in sj. In other words, if β<
δg
l ,
environmental standards, sA,s B, are strategic substitutes. Alternatively, if
β>
δg
l , environmental standards, sA,s B, are strategic complements. That
is, if the marginal eﬀect of one country’s standard on the local pollution in
the other country, i.e., the negative externality generated to other country,
is less (greater) than a critical level, environmental standards are strategic
substitutes (complements). In other words, if the strategic eﬀect due to
global pollution dominates the strategic eﬀect due to local pollution, sA and
sB are strategic substitute; otherwise, sA and sB are strategic complements.
1For many parametric conﬁgurations, these restrictions are satisﬁed.
7Proposition 1: If an increase in environmental standard in one country
generates negative externality to other country less than a critical level, i.e.,
if β<
δg
l , environmental standards (sA and sB) are strategic substitutes.
Alternatively, if such negative externality is beyond that critical level, i.e., if
β>
δg
l , environmental standards (sA and sB) are strategic complements.
Proposition 1 indicates that, given the initial level of local and global
pollution (L0 and G0) and countries’ perceptions about harmfulness of global
pollution (δ), strategic nature (substitutes or complements) of environmental
standards depend on the intensity of international trade, since the degree of
negative externality of environmental standard to other country depends on
the intensity of international trade. If there is no trade between countries,
i.e, if countries are completely closed, β<
δg
l always holds true, since β =0
in case of closed economies; hence, environmental standards are strategic
substitutes in case of closed economies.
Now, the F.O.Cs of two countries’ minimization problems yield reaction
functions
sA =














of country A and B, respectively. Clearly, if β<
δg
l , i.e., if sA and sB
are strategic substitutes, reactions functions (6) and (7) will be negatively
sloped in the sA − sB plane. Alternatively, if sA and sB are strategic com-
plements, reaction functions will be upward slopping. Note that the reac-







∂sA)]CountryB > 0. That is, given country j’s environmental stan-
dard, country i sets higher environmental standard, if β is higher, i.e., if
the marginal increase of local pollution in one country due to an increase in
standard in the other country is higher. Also, if β is higher, change in coun-
try i’s environmental standard due to a change in country j’s environmental
standard will be lower (higher) when si and sj are strategic substitutes (com-
plements). Solving (6) and (7), we get the Cournot-Nash equilibrium levels
of environmental standards as given in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1: In case of partially open economies, when countries choose
environmental standards independently and simultaneously, the Cournot-Nash





Clearly, the equilibrium environmental standards increase with an in-
crease in negative externality of environmental standard in one country to
the other country, ∂s∗
∂β > 0. The reason is, higher is the negative exter-
nality (i.e, higher is the β), countries’ incentives to counteract by raising
environmental standard is higher. It implies that, countries set higher envi-
ronmental standards when sA and sB are strategic complements compared to
that in case of strategic substitutability of standards. This is consistent with
the implications of industrial organization theories. Note that, in the present
scenario, positive externality of environmental standard in country j to coun-
try i, in terms of economic gain to country i (ρsj), does not aﬀect equilibrium
environmental standards; only negative externalities matter. The reason is,
while choosing environmental standards independently and simultaneously,
countries fail to internalize economic gains due to environmental standard
imposed in other country. Since countries are symmetric with respect to
the loss function, countries set the same level of environmental standards in
9equilibrium. It implies that, in equilibrium, environmental standards does
not have any eﬀect on terms of trade.
We now characterise the optimum environmental standards from the
world ’s perspective. The loss of the world is the sum of the losses of the
countries. Therefore, we can write the problem as follows.
MinsA,sB DW = DA + DB = l[(1 − sA + βsB)
2 +( 1− sB + βsA)
2]+
2δ(2 − sA − sB)
2 + sA(c + w − ρ)+sB(c + w − ρ)
(8)
Note that, in our context, the problem (8) can also be interpreted as
the problem of the countries together, if they set environmental standards
cooperatively.2 Solving this problem we get the equilibrium outcome as given
in Lemma 2.





2l(1−β)2+8δg = sw. These are also the equilibrium environ-
mental standards, if countries decide environmental standards cooperatively.
Clearly, if c + w − ρ<[l(1 − β)+
4δg(1−2β)
1−β ], ∂sw
∂β > 0. Therefore, we
can say that, the world optimum level of environmental standards, i.e., the
cooperative level of environmental standards, increase with an increase in
β, if the cost of imposing environmental standard is low. Now, the cost of
imposing standard in country i is negatively related to marginal economic
gain (ρ) due to environmental standard in country j. So, the world optimum
level of environmental standard increases with an increase in β,i fρ is high,
ρ>ˆ ρ = c + w − l(1 − β) −
4δg(1−2β)
1−β . In other words, if countries decides en-
vironmental standards cooperatively, equilibrium level of standard increases
2Such situation is similar to that of collusion among ﬁrms.
10due to an increase in β,i fρ>ˆ ρ. This result is in contrast to that in case
of independent and simultaneous choice of environmental standards by the
countries.




if ρ>¯ ρ, sw >s ∗. That is, in equilibrium, the world optimum level of envi-
ronmental standards are lower (higher) compared to that chosen by countries
independently and simultaneously, if the positive externality (marginal eco-
nomic gain) of one country due to an increase in environmental standard of
the other country is lower (higher) than a critical level. It indicates that,
if ρ<¯ ρ, at the world optimum level of standards both local pollution in
countries and global pollution will be higher compared to that at the equi-
librium standards set by countries independently and simultaneously. 3 In
other words, if ρ<¯ ρ, cooperative standard setting leads to higher pollution,
both local and global, than in case of strategic standard setting by countries.
Proposition 2: When economies are partially open, in equilibrium,
the world optimum level of environmental standards are lower (higher) than
that under strategic (i.e., non-cooperative) standard setting by countries, if
marginal economic gain (ρ) of one country due to an increase in environ-
mental standard in the other country is less (greater) than a critical level
(¯ ρ). Moreover, if ρ<¯ ρ, levels of local and global pollution are also higher at
the world optimum level of standards.
From the above proposition, we can say that, in case of partially open
economies, coordination among countries to set environmental standards may
cause more damage to the environment compared to the situation where no
3ρ<¯ ρ ⇒ sw <s ∗ ⇒ G(sw,s w) <G (s∗,s ∗), from (2); and Li(sw,s w) <L i(s∗,s ∗),
i = A,B,f r o m( 1 ) ,s i n c e0<β<1.
11such coordination is possible. It also indicates that existence of supranational
authorities, which can set standards for countries or facilitates cooperation
among countries to set standards jointly, may be detrimental for the envi-
ronment in certain situations.
3 Closed Economies
We now consider a scenario in which both countries, A and B, are closed.
Since both are closed economies, no trade is possible between countries.
Therefore, there is no positive or negative externalities of environmental
standards of one country to the other country, except its eﬀect on global
pollution. So, we have β =0a n dρ = 0 in (1) and (3) respectively.
Clearly, in case of closed economies, environmental standards, sA and sB,
are strategic substitutes. When countries decide environmental standards
independently and simultaneously, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium levels of
environmental standards are as given in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3: In case of closed economies, when countries decide environ-
mental standards independently and simultaneously, the Cournot-Nash equi-





Comparing Lemma 1 and Lemma 3, we get s∗c <s ∗. That is, in case of
closed economies countries set lower environmental standards compared to
that in case of partially open economies. Since there is no negative external-
ity of environmental standard of one country to the other in case of closed
economies, a country’s local pollution solely depends on its own standard.
That is, the strategic eﬀect due to local pollution is non-existent in case of
closed economies. As a result, equilibrium level of environmental standard is
lower in case of closed economies compared to that in case of partially open
12economies.
Now, analysing environmental standard setting from the world’s perspec-
tive we get the following.
Lemma 4: In case of closed economies, if the world optimum level of





Comparing Lemma 2 and Lemma 4 we get swc <s w,i fi nc a s eo fp a r -
tially open economies the marginal economic gain (ρ) of country i due to
environmental standard in country j is greater than a critical level (ˆ ρ =
c+w−l(1−β)−
4δg(1−2β)
1−β ). Otherwise, if ρ<ˆ ρ, swc >s w. That is, the world
optimum level of standards in case of closed economies are lower (higher)
compared to that for partially open economies, if, in case of partially open
economies, the extent of positive externality, in terms of economic gain, to
the other country is high (low).
Now, comparing Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 yields the following proposition.
Proposition 3: In case of closed economies, the world optimum level of
environmental standards are higher than the simultaneous and independent
choice of individual countries: swc >s ∗c.
Clearly, it indicates that, if countries set environmental standards co-
operatively, in case of closed economies both local and global pollution are
lower compared to the situation where environmental standards are chosen
by countries independently and simultaneously. Note that, in case of closed
economies, environmental standards are strategic substitutes (
∂2Di
∂sj∂si =2 δg >
0). In other words, there is no strategic eﬀect due to local pollution; only
strategic eﬀect due to global pollution is in place. Therefore, countries tend
to set lower standards in case of non-cooperative setting compared to the
world optimum level. Therefore, in case of closed economies, cooperative
standard setting, or existence of supranational authority that decides envi-
13ronmental standards for countries or facilitates cooperative standard setting,
leads to lower pollution, both local and global. In contrast to this, as we have
seen in Section 2, in case of partially open economies cooperative standard
setting or the existence of supranational authority may lead to higher pol-
lution. Therefore, the impact of cooperative standard setting or the impact
of the existence of supranational authority on the environment, compared
to that of the strategic choice of standards, crucially depends on (a) trade
policies of countries and (b) marginal economic gain of one country due to
environmental standard in the other country.
4 Fully Open Economies
We now attempt to analyse a scenario in which economies are fully open. In
other words, free trade between countries as well as relocation of production
units from one country to the other is allowed. In this scenario, higher en-
vironmental standard in country i not only adversely aﬀects its comparative
advantage in trade, it may also induce ﬁrms to relocate production units
from country i to country j. For the shake of simplicity we assume that,
if sj >s i ( i,j = A,B, i  = j), some production units are relocated from
country j to country i. Therefore, the marginal eﬀect of country j’s envi-
ronmental standard on country i’s local pollution is higher in case of fully
open economies compared to that in case of partially open economies. We
can rewrite the level of local pollution in country i, in case of fully open
economies, as follows.
Li = L
0(1 − si + ˜ βsj), ˜ β>β (1a)
The expression for global pollution remains same as that in case of partially
open economies, given by (2). Now, the cost of imposing environmental
14standard of country i, in case of open economies, is as follows.
Ci = csi + wsi − ρsj − φ(sj − si)
= csi +( w + φ)si − (ρ + φ)sj, (3a)
i,j = A,B, i  = j,0<φ<w ,w h e r eφ is the marginal economic gain (loss) of
country i due to relocation of production units from country j (i) to country i
(j), if sj > (<)si. The objective functions of countries and the world-damage
function are similar to (5) and (8) except β, w and ρ are now replaced by ˜ β,
w + φ,a n dρ + φ respectively.
Since ˜ β>β , strategic eﬀect due to local pollution is higher in case of fully
open economies compared to that in case of partially open economies. It may
induce countries to set higher standards. However, on the other hand, some
production units may relocate to the other country due to lower standard
there, which induces countries to set lower standard. The net eﬀect depends
on the relative strength of these two eﬀects and on the strategic eﬀect due to
global pollution. When countries set environmental standards independently
and simultaneously, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium standards are as follows.
Lemma 5: In case of fully open economies, if countries set environ-
mental standards independently and simultaneously, the Cournot-Nash equi-






2l(1−˜ β)+4δg = s∗f.
Clearly, ˜ β and φ has opposing eﬀects on s∗f. Therefore, whether countries
set higher standard in case of fully open economies, compared to that in case
of partially open economies, depends on the relative strength of these two
opposing eﬀects: increase in local pollution due to relocation and increase in
economic gain due to relocation.
The world optimum level of environmental standards, which are same as
15the equilibrium standards set by countries cooperatively, are as follows.
Lemma 6: In case of fully open economies, the world optimum level of






2l(1−˜ β)2+8δg = swf.
Note that, in contrast to the situation where countries decide environmen-
tal standards independently and simultaneously (i.e., non-cooperatively), the
world optimum level of environmental standards do not depend on the eco-
nomic cost (or gain) of countries due to relocation. However, unlike in case
where countries decide standards non-cooperatively, the world optimum level
of standards crucially depends on the parameter ρ, which is marginal eco-
nomic gain due to increase in comparative advantage in international trade of
commodities triggered by an increase in environmental standard in the other
country. Comparing Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 yields the following proposition.
Proposition 4: In case of fully open economies, the world optimum
level of environmental standards are lower (higher) compared to the equi-
librium levels when countries set environmental standards strategically, if
marginal economic gain due to increase in comparative advantage in interna-
tional trade of commodities triggered by an increase in environmental stan-
dard in the other country is lower (higher) than a critical level ˜ ρ, where
˜ ρ =
[2l+4δg−c−w−φ][2l(1−˜ β)2+8δg]
2l(1−˜ β)+4δg − [2l(1 − ˜ β)+8 δg − c − w].
From Proposition 2 and Proposition 4, we can say that the impacts of
strategic choice of environmental standards, compared to that under coop-
erative standard setting, are very similar in cases of partially open and fully
open economies. Since the impact of ˜ β on ˜ ρ is ambiguous, possible reloca-
tion of plants from one country to the other due to diﬀerential environmental
standards in case of fully open economies need not necessarily increase the
possibility of global optimum standards to be less than the non-cooperative
16equilibrium standards compared to that in case of partially open economies.
5 Conclusion
This paper examines the strategic nature of choice of environmental stan-
dards under diﬀerent degrees of openness of countries and compares equi-
librium outcomes with the world optimum. It shows that, if countries are
open to trade, strategic choice of environmental standards leads to higher
levels of standards and lower pollution compared to that in case of closed
economies. It also shows that whether cooperative choice of environmental
standards, which gives rise to world optimum, leads to higher environmental
standards or not, compared to the situation where countries decide environ-
mental standards non-cooperatively, crucially depends on (a) the degree of
trade openness and (b) the marginal economic gain of one country due to
increase in environmental standard in other country. In case of partially
open economies, if the second factor is weak, simultaneous and independent
choice, i.e., strategic choice, of environmental standards by countries leads
to higher environmental standards than the world optimum. In contrast, the
world optimum level of environmental standards are always higher than that
under strategic choice, in case of closed economies.
Our results indicate that existence of supranational authorities that set
environmental standards for the countries from the world welfare perspective
or facilitates cooperation among countries to set environmental standards
cooperatively, need not necessarily lead to lower levels of pollution compared
to that under strategic choice.
In this paper, for simplicity, we have considered symmetric loss functions
of countries. However, it is easy to observe that as long as countries are not
17too asymmetric with respect to their loss functions, qualitative results of this
paper will remain valid. Nonetheless, it might be interesting to examine the
implications of diﬀerent aspects of asymmetry between countries explicitly.
It might also be interesting to extend the present analysis by considering
repeated move of countries.
References
Chichilnisky, G. (1994). North-south trade and the global environment.
American Economic Review, 84(4):851–74.
Copeland, B. R. and Taylor, M. S. (1994). North-south trade and the envi-
ronment. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(3):755–87.
Copeland, B. R. and Taylor, M. S. (1995). Trade and transboundary pollu-
tion. American Economic Review, 85(4):716–37.
Copeland, B. R. and Taylor, M. S. (2003). Trade and the Environment:
Theory and Evidence. Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford.
18